Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection

Historical Cornell Law School

1895

Personal Priviledge of the Witness in Criminal
Proceedings
Frederick W. Welsh
Cornell Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Welsh, Frederick W., "Personal Priviledge of the Witness in Criminal Proceedings" (1895). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection.
Paper 7.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

T

FI 1S I 3

PERSO TAL PRIVILEDGE OF TI-TE VIT'TESS PIT CRITHI-AL PROCEEDICS

.. . .o.o...... o...

Presented for thc De',ree

Pachelor of Laws

by

7

rederick

T.

,Telsh

Cornell Univ rsit

1895

7

PERSONAL PRIVILEDGE OF

HE WITNESS IN CRIMINAfl PROCEEDINGS.

Introduction.
That no person should be compelled to accuse himslf or
give evidence which would incr-iminate himself was one of
those prinniples

of evidence

ized into a maxim before
ence.
it

old enough to have been crystal-

the Law of Evidence came

Not less resp cted for its

into

antiquity than for

existen

it sforth

has long been lauded as one of the distinguished and distiq

guishing features

of tha t Anglo Saxon jurisprudence

which has

ever regarded the protection of the personal rights of the
individual as one of its most sacred aims.
ihe tirm

and manner

ple into

of the

introduction of this

princi-.

law
1nglish
must be purely a matter of conjecture.

The earliest forms of trial, the denial by oath, the
tion, the ordeal,

compurga-

the trial by jury without evidence submit.

ted, and trial by wager of battle involved no examination of
witnesses.

Trials by a jury to whom evidence was submitted

occurred as early as the twelfth century,

but during that

tury the trial by compurgation was most ecu-xmon and it

cen-

was not

2
jury trials

until the time of THenry T1. that these
nesses were fully established.

"ere

can scarcely be any

doubt that they were inquisitorial in
a strong prejudice a,-;ainst
fact that parties in

such

with wit-

and that

their mehtods;

ethods soon

orew up.

.he

Tere :i.ot allowed to act as

civil suits

witnesses for themselves nor compelled to give evidence af-ainst themselves was, in all probability, the source of the
claim that a similar -, lan would be pursued in

criminal trials.

the revolution of 1688 we find

During the century preceding

(a)
numerous

cases boldly asserting this principle for the protecbut nevertheless

tion of' both witnesses and accused,

principal part of

ination of the prisoner himself formed the
the trial

during that same period,

the exam-

and the crown was con-

stanitly over-riding the law with its royal prerog-rative and issuin-,

warrants under v:rich witnesses

and prisoners were tor-

tured to obtain evidence and confessions.
affairs the revolution of 1688 produced

and it

is

not at all

surprising

whose purpose w.as to assert and
peoplc should result in

state of

th is

a decided

change.

that a revolution

aintain

the permanent est

the righ,-ts
Di

ishient

of th: e
of tile

personal privilegTe of both the witness and the accused.
(a)
50; Collier v.

Lei~h's ease and
Collier, 1 Cro-ke,

as
3 Croke,388; ]Lurro;'s. ...
bar t,8;

Cooke's
.

aseI

It

cai v6 f Evidence dates from tr:is

has be n well said that the
point;

In

3,
3

SCak,

Case cited in
_de'
201; h i:-to
~Iolt's

T: r

_1ds.G
2enC1 0-.
l5.

Tis

5 i; ils.
Case,
i

o
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privilege,
one of the

thus earl.

established,

has been ever regarded a.

safe guards of personal freodom,

been asserted,

in one form or another in

the United States and in

and as such h-s

the Constitution of

those of nearly all

the

states of the

Union.

ment

The application

of this general principle mnd the settle-

of the nunerous

points of dispute which necessarily a-

rose was,

of course,

of this thesis is

a matter

for the courts:

and the purpose

to select and classify the best results of

such judicial interpretation.

SEC.

L.

EXTFTTT

OF TIlE COSTITUTI

HAL PROVISIO'S.

It is of importance in this discussion to understand the
extent of these constitutional provisions so that
termine whether the privilege

v-re ray de-

of the vritnes reste upon com-

mon law or statutory ;-asis and is thus subject to change by
the le-islature,) or whether it is more firmly fixed in the constitution of the United States and of the several states. An
examination of the constitutional and statutory provisions
will show a marked diversity in language.

In the constitu-

tions of Georgia, California, New York and the United States
the provision is that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal, case to be a witness against himself.

In others we

find "H o man can be compelled to ;.-ive evidence a-ainst himself"; in prosecutions the accused
F-ive evidence aj!ainst

-imsclf1"

prosecution, shall be compelled
self;

"shall nct be coiipelled to

that no pe-rson inahy:-crtminal
to ,-ive evidence ag ainst him-

that no person sh:all. be"compelled to accuse or furnish

evidence

against himself.

constitution

of

'1rnv York

YTith sucb a provision in
the ea'licrn

decisions

rst

t-,
tis

state
rigt ht

5

entirely upon common law authority.

Later the common law

(a)
doctrine was embodied in the Code, and since that

time the

cases have rested their decisions upon the Code.

In People

v. Kelly (24 N. Y. 74),

the court said, "It is perfectly well

settled that where there is no legal provision to protect the
witness against the reading of the testimony on his own trial,
he cannot be compelled to answer.

(The People v Mather, 4

Wend. 229, and casesthere referred to.)

This course of adju-

dication did not result from any judicial construction of the
constitution, but is a branch of the common law doctrine which
excuses a person from giving testimony which will tend to disgrace him, to charge him with a penalty or forfeiture,
convict him of a crime.

or to

It is of course competent for the

legislature to change any doctrine of the common law, but I
think they could not compel a witness to testify on the trial
of another person to facts which would prove himself guilty
of a crime without indemnifying him against the consequences,
because I think, as has been mentioned, that by a legal construction the constitution would be found to forbid it". While
in New York the question is thus involved in obscurity, the
United States Courts have decided squarely that the meaning of

(a)

Code of Crim. Pro. Sec. 10; Code of Civ. Pro. Sec.
837.

the constitutional

provision is

to be a witness

not be compelled

nal prosecution against himself;

against himself in
but

that a person shall not be compelled,
ness

in

any investigation,

person shall

not merely that I

its object is

a crimito ensure

when acting as a wit-

to give testimony which may tend

In this hold(a)
A court
ing the state courts have very generally concurred.
to show that he himself has committed a crime.

which holds to the strict
al privilege applies

construction that the constitution-

only to the accused in

a proceeding

gainst himself would also be compelled toiold
inary proceedings,
the Grand Jury,

the

investigations

in

that

a-

prelimt-

of the coroner and of

the constitutional protection would not apply

as that would be no proceeding against any person,

and there-

fore the legislature would be enabled to give and grant the
privilege at its pleasure.

(a)

State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307.
Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255.
Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
Cull en v. Comm., 24 Gratt. 624.
State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314.
L~a Fontaine v. So. Underwriters,
Temple v. Comm., 75 Va. 892.

83' N.

Car.

132.

7

The courts have uniformly held

SEC.2on.sjr2uci0fn liberal.

provisions must be

and statutory

such constitutional

that

construed as an immunity

most broadly and liberally

(a)
This should be

lege.

clearly kept

or privien-

the

mind throughout

in

discussion.

tire
SEC.#

In

Books and pa&ers.
is

tion it

held that

books or papers,

accordance

the witness

is

broad construe

with this

excused

from producing

the contents of which may be used against

(b)
him.
SEC.4.-Tendency to incriminate.
ry privileges give
those

questions

the witness his privilege

the answers

not

only as to

to which might directly

nate him but also when the answers might
to a legal prosecution.

aril statuto-

The constitutional

incrimi-

tend to subject

The language of Judge Marshall

him
in

(c)
Burr's Trial

(a)

(b)

has long been regarded as an accurate

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
State v. Newell, 58 N. H. 314.
Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463.

statement

547.

363.
Minters v. People, 139 Ill.
Temple v. Commronwealth, 75 Va. 892.
Printz v. Cheeney, 11 Iowa, 469.
People v. Mather, 4 Wend 230
Stevens v. State, 50 Kansas, 712.
Warren v. Lucas, 10 Ohio, 337.
Peo. v. Brewer, 27/ Mich. 134.
Fellows v. Wilson, 31 Barb. 162.
Peo. ex rel Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N . Y. 219
Rapaije on Witnesses, Sec. 262.
Byass v. Sulliuan, 21 How.
Wharton's Law of Evidence,

1 Burr's Trial, 245.

Pr.
Sec.

50751 and cases

cited.
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the law.

"

Many links frequently compose that chain of

testimony, which is necessary to convict an individual of a
crime.

It appears to the court to be the true sense of the

rule, that no witness is compellable to furnishA any one of
them against himself.
but a probable case,

It is certainly not only a possible
that a witness by disclosing a single

fact, may complete the testimony against himself, and. to every
effectual purpose, accuse himself entirely, as he would by
stating every circumstance which would be required for his
conviction.

That fact of itself would be unavailing, but all

other facts without it would be insufficient.

While that re-

mains concealed in his own bosom, he is safe; but draw it fran
thence and he is exposed tio a prosecution.

The r Qle which

declares that no man is compellable to accuse himself would.
most obviously be infringed by compelling a witness to dis

-

close a fact of this description.

(a)
This rule has been generally followed without hesitation.
(a)

Best on Ev.
Am. Notes.
Printz v. Cheeney, 11 Iowa, 439.
Peo. v.. Mather, 4 Wen. 429.
Rich nan v. State, 2 Green (Iowa) 532.
Comm. v. Howell, 5 Gratt ( Va.) 334.
Burns v. Kempshall, 24 Wend. 330.
'Bank of Salina v. Henry, 1 U. Y. 83.
Stewart v. Turner, 3 Edw. Ch. 458.
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SEC. 5.

DISGRACE.
do not go,

But farther than this the constitutions
the claim of the privilege
must rest entirely

W where the answer might disgrace

on other foundations.

this claim has resulted in

and

The discussion of

this country in

fused and contradictory decisions.

a great nass of con-

The subject has been

complicated by the weighty reasons which may be urged both pro
and con;

by the uncertainty as to the rule in

the statutes passed in many of the states,
to prove his

England,

making it

former criminal record by the witness.

many courts used loose language in

decisions

and by

possible
Then

on the subject

when the objection to the question was made by the counsel for
one of the parties on the ground of irrelevancy.

Added to

this was the confusion of the discretionary power of the judge
over cross-examination with the privilege of the witness.
Nevertheless,

it

is

believed that the following propositions

will be found to be in

accord with the better line of cases,

and will reconcile most justly the rights of the parties to
whatever evidence
ness,

the witness can give,

the rights of the wit-

and the demands of public policy.
(I)

There the question imputing disgrace is

irrelevant

to the issue and. also to the credibility of thle witness,
counsel for the opposite party may object,
claim his privileg,

and the judge at hif

the witness may
discretion may ex

l0
clude the question althiough there has been neitler objection

(a)

nor claim of privilege.

(2)

When the question is material to the issue, t3l

witness should be compelled t'o answer, notwithstanding he
(b)
bring disgrace upon himself by so doing.
(a)

Peo. v. Crapo, 73 N. Y. 288.
Peo. v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541.
Hayward v. Peo. 9^ Ill. 492.

(b)

Wharton I, Sec. 542.
Greenleaf I, Sec. 454.
Lohman v. Peo. 1 N. Y. 379.
Taylor v. Jennings, 7 Rob. 581.
Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wen. 250.
1 Burr's Tr. 244.
State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113.
Gutterson v. Morse, 58 N. H. 165.
Smith v. Casster, 1 Gray, 108.

Comm v.
Burnett
West v.
Peo. v.

Curtis, 97 Mass. 574.
v. Whalon, 11 Abb. Pr. 157.
Lynch, 7 Daily, 245.
Irving, 95 N. Y. 541.

Howell v. Commn. 5 Gratt, 664.
State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. L. 346.
Hunt v. Mc Calla, 20 Iowa, 20.
Ragland v. Wickware, 4 J. J. Marsh, 530.
Jennings v. Prentice, 39 Mich. 421.
Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 98.
Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Cls.rk v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89.
Peo. v. Furtado, 57 Cal. 345.

Brite v. Stile, 10 Tex. App. 368.
Stephens Dig; of Ev. Sec. 129, in
Chase's Ed. Note 1, P. 225.
Kendrick v. Comm. 78 Va. 490.
Contra.
Vaughn v. Perrino, 2 Penn. (N.J.) 29 9.
Merlwzzi v. Gleeson, 59 Md. 214.
U. S. v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. 729.
Galbraith v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeat es, 515.

Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140.
Ingall v. State 48 Wis. 647.
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(3)

But when the question imputing disgrace is

not ma-

terial to the issue and is

put only for the purpose of testing
(a)
the credibility of the witness, he may decline to answer.
(a)

See cases cited supra to effect that witness may
refuse to answer any question which might dis-

grace him, and
R. v. Hodgslon, R. & R. 211.
Dodd v.

Morris,

4 Camp.

519.

Friend's Case, 4 St. Tr. 225.
Lewis's Case, 4 Esp. 225.
U. S. v. Dickinson, 2 Mc Lean,

325.

St. v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380.
State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113.
Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
Peo. v. Herrick,, 13 Johns. R. 82.

Lohman v. Peo. 1 Coms t. 379.
In Re Lewis, 39 How. Pr. 155.
Resp v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, 429.
State v. Bailey, 1 Penn. ( N.J.) 304.
Vaughn v. Perrine, 2 Penn. ( N.J.) 534.
Houser v. Comm. 51 Pa. St. 332.
Howel v. Comm. 5 Gratt, 664.
Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729.
Leach v. Peo. 53 Ill.
311.
Hayward. v. Peo. 96 Ill. 492.
State v. Garrett, 1 Busbee, 357.
Campbell v. St. 23 Ala. 44.
Marx v- Bell, 48 Ala. 497.
Washington v. State, 63 Ala. 189.
Harper v. R. R. 47 Mo. 567.
Shepard v. Parker, 36 N. Y. 517.
Peo. v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73.
Chase's Stephen's Dig. of Ev. Note 1,
p.

225,

and cases

cited.
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Of the situation in Engl.atnd,
The treat question, however,

Greenleaf says,

in Sec. 459,

whether a witness may not be

"

bound in some cases to answer an interrogatory to his own

"

moral degraoation,
main issue,

"

it

is

where. , though it

for veracity,

has not yet been brought into direct and solemn judgnent,,
an open question,

notwith-

standing the practice of eminent judges at Nisi Prius in

" favor of the inquiry,
"

collateral to the

relevant to his character

" and must therefore be regarded. as
"

is

under the limitations we have above

stated.

Statutory changes have been numerous; mostly in the line
of permitting his former criminal record to be proved by the

(a)

witness himself.

But mere charges or indictments m(b)
since they are consistent With innocence

not be inquired into,
Some states,

as Iowa and Georgia,

have statutes giving to wit-

nesses the same privilege of refusal where the answer would
disgrace,

as the comrmn law gave where the answer would incrim
(c)

inate.
(a)

N. Y. Code of Civ. Procedure, Sec. 832.
Common Law Proc. Act, 1854, 17 & 18,
Vict. C. 125, Sec. 25 & 103.
28 Vict. C. 18, Sec. 6.

(b)

Pee. v.
Peo. v.
Ryan v.

(c)

Iowa Cod.e,

Crapo, 76 N. Y. 2838.
Brown, 72 N. Y. 571.
Peo. 79 N. Y. 594.
Sec.

Georgia Code,

3647.

Sec.

3814.

13
SEC.

6.

CIVIL LIABILITY.

But a witness

cannot excuse himself on the

round. that

(a)
his

answer would expose him to civil liability.

SEC. 7.

HUSBAND OR WIFE.

The privilege
tend to incriminate,
witness.

Even in

extends
or
the

to answers.which would criminate,

disgl'ace the wife or husband of the
inquisitorial

nesses were not compelled

proceedure of Rome,

to give evidence

wit-

against near rela-

(b)
tives.

For a

a part

long period of the English law this

of that exclusionary rule

formed

which prohibited a husband or

(c)
wife

from acting

reform in

as witnesses

evidence

has

one for the other.

swept aside

the

exclusion,

The
but retained

(d)
the privilege.
(a)

Civ. Code N. Y. See. 837.
46 Geo. III,
C. 37.
Wharton's Ev. I, See. 537,

and numerous

(b)

Hunter's

(c)

State v. Welch, 26 Me. 30.
State v. Gardner, 1 Root, 485.
Peo. v. Horton, 4 Mich. 37.
Comm. v. Sparks, 7 Allen, 534.

Roman Law,

p.

900.

The Inhabitants of Cliviger,

(di

cases

2 T.

R. 233.

Comm. v. Reid, 8 Phil. Rep. 385.
State v. Briggs, 9 R. 1. 361.
St ate v. Dudley, 9 Wis. 664.
State v. Bridgeman, 49 Vt. 202.
St ate v. Marvin, 35 N. H. 22.
Cartwright v. Green, 8 Vesey, 405.
Regina v. Halliday, Bell 257.

Regina v. All Saints, 6 M.& S. 200.
2 Taylor's Ev. 1453.
Best on Ev. p. 533.
Stephens Digest of Ev. Sec. 120.
Law of 1872, C. 182, Sec. 715 Pen. Code.

N. Y.

cited.
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SEC.

8.

PRIVILEGE PURELY PERSONAL.

The privilege is

purely a personal one,

and. can be clai-rn

ed only by the witness himself; not by the party against whom
(a)
he is called.
Neither is it the privilege of counsel
(b)v0
It is a question between the
objection.
to interpose the
witness

and. the court with which the party has nothing ta do.,

iid with which the counsel for neither party has any right to
But if

interfere.

the question be irrelevant,

or immaterial

or objectionable to either party for any other sufficient reasa)n,

the counsel may interpose his objections,

may be ruled out.

But in cases of privilege,

may be asked and the vritness

(c)

(a) Comvm. v. Shaw, 4 Cush.
Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal.
Coburn v. Odell, 30 N.
Macarty v. Bond, 9 La.
Regina v. Kinglake, 11

(c)

594.
89.
H. 540.
351.
Cox. 499.

Tlomas v. Newton, M.& M. 48.
Regina v. Adey, 1 M. & R. 94.
State v.

Wentworth,

the question

compelled to answer or rel

his privilege.

(b)

and the question

65 Me.

234.

Peo. v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710.
U. S. v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C.
Vaughn v. Perrine, 3 N. 5. L.
Fries v. Brugher, 12 N. 5. L.
Chamberlain v. Wilson, 12 Vt.

732.
728.
79.

439.
Treat v. Browning, 4 Conn. 408.
Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 259.

Newcomb v. St ate, 37 Miss. 38 3.
Low v. Mitchell, 18 Me. 372.
St. v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246.
Simmns v. Holster, 13 Minn. 249.

upon

15
Although counsel

nevertheless

gal trials,
in

are not recogrized in

for witnesses

I see no reason why a witness

perhaps made a witness

who is

for a criminal offense,

danger of being brought to trial

who is

le-

for the express purpose of draw-

ing from him damaging evidence,

may not have counsel

as t:e his

legal right to refuse

to answer any question.

A keen law-

yer may see the drift

of an entangling question and have

decis

-ion to refuse to answer where the stupid witness would sus to take advantage of the

pect nothing,

and the frightened fail

privilege.

This rule will undoubtedly go the way of that

one which refused counsel to prisoners aceused of felony.
It

considered the duty of' the judge to warn the witness,

is

but the judge is

often totally unprepared for such a duty and

more often neglects it

danger has the right to the keen,
legal adviser,
all

its

SEC.

9.

who is

Any witness who is

entirely.

in

interested assistsnce of a

perfectly familiar with the situation in

aspects.
DUTY OF JUDGIE.

The position of the judge when an incriminating question
is

asked and b efor-e the witness has

claimed his privilege has

not been accurately and definitely

determined,

but the better

authorities hold that the judge is

not bound at the request

of a party, or on his own motion, to notify the waitness of his
(a)
though he mar at his discretion
privilege in tis relation;

16
(b)
give an intimation to this efrect,

and when -tle witness

appears to be ignorant of his rights in

thiis respect,

it

is

(c)
proper tbat he should be advised of them.
of the parties to the action,
relief

nor the witness,

But neither
could claim any

for the failure of the judge to so advise the witnesses.
(a)

Atty. Gen. v. Radloff, 10 Exq. R. 83.
U. S.v.Darnand, 2 Wall Jr. 143 - 179.
Comm. v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594.
Wharton on Ev. I, Sec. 535.

(b)

Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 764.
R. v. Boyse, 2 Fost. & F. 158.
Foster v. Pierce, 11 Cush. 437.
Comm. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472.
Mayo v. Mayo, 119 Mass.. 292.

(c)

Friend's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 15.
Dixon v. Vale, 1 C. & P. 278.
R. v. Wheater, 2 Mood C. C. 95.
Southard. v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254.
Rosewell's Case, 10 How. St. Tr. 168.
R. v. De Berenger, Gurney, 194.
Lord Cardig'an's G se, Gurney, 79.
St. v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246.
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SEC. 10.

WAIVER.
privilege

The witness may, of course, waive his

and ans-

(a)
But a waiver may alsQ be inferred

wer the question.

from the previous conduct of the witness in

at what point in

The question then comes,

questions.

relation to other

The answer to

examination can the privilege be claimed.
this

in England is

thus stated by Best,

the

129:

See.

"

used

It

"to be considered that the witness who intended to claim the
"privilege of not answering questions of this nature was bound
"to claim his privilege at once; and that,

if

he began a crim-

"inative statement when he might have refused to make it,
"was compellable to go on with it,-

a rule pr-obably establish-

"ed with a view of preventing witnesses

from converting the

"privilzege given by law for their own protection,
"of serving one of the litigant parties,
"vilege when their eviden-ce
"in

Reg.

v.

Garbett,

2 Car.

"overruled the old notion,
"claim his

(a)

began to tell
& K. 495,

into a means

by setting up the priagainst him.

But

a majority of the judges

and held that the witness might

protection at any stage of the inquiry."

Ohamberlayn 's
Am. notes, p.

he

Best on EU.
538, and cases cited.
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Whatever may be the effect of Reg.
in

Garbett in

v.

this country the rule is not so settled.

England,

As long as

there has arisen no prejudice to either party by the testimony
already given,

there is

no doubt that the witness may assert

his right at any time, whether or not crimination has been in-

(a)
volved in

the part already stated.

But when a witness

voluntarily opens an account of a transaction exposing him to
a criminal prosecution and gives evidence which will assist
him or the party calling him, he is obliged to complete the
narrative and cannot rely on his privilege on direct or cross(b)
examination*
It amounts to a waiver of his right.
(a)

Wharton,

(b)

Peo. v. Freshour, 55 Cal. 375.
Wharton, See. 539.
Rapalje on Witnesses, See. 269.
Comm. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462.
State v. K. 4 N. H. 562.
Coburn v. Odell, 10 Foster (N.H.)
540.
Foster v. Pierce, 11 Cush. 437.
Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Verm. 491.
Daw v. Mitchell, 18 Me. 374.
1 Stark Ev. 3rd Ed. 298.
Comm. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472.
Peo. v. Carroll, 3 Park C. R.
N. Y.) 73.
Peo. v. Lohman, 2 Barb. 216.
Youngs v. Yboungs, 5 Redf. ( N. Y.) 505.
Alderman v. Pe'o. 4 Mich. 414.
Locke v. State, 63 Ala. 5.
State v. Blake, 25 Me. 350.

See.

539.
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A dictum in

Coburn Y.

Odell,

553,

10 Foster,

the

" If a witness

limits of this rule in a satisfactory manner.
"purposely states a part of the transaction,

states

siich- as. will make

"for him or the party calling him, even though but slightly,
"he should not be protected; but where it is apparent thaat he
"intends to disclose nothing that may require his going farther
"and what he does

disclose may well enough stand without affect-

"ing the point at issue,

and moreover is

drawn out by questions

"where the full effect of the answers cannot readily be seen
"by him,

his privilege shall not thereby be taken from him.

But it

was held in

Temple Y. Comm.

fact that a witness testified
evidenice

an indictment was found-,

24 Gratt.,

that the
and on his

will not deprive him of his
on the trial.

contains a similar holding,

inary examination was at a coroner's

SEC. l1.

892,

before a grsnd jury,

privilege of decliningir to testify
Case,

75 Va.

Cullen's
where

the prelim-

inquest.

LOSS.

The privilege may be lost through the operation of a
pardon,

of the statute of limitations,

and of the statutes

(a)
granting indemnity and amnesty.
Statute of Limitations,

affect only the liability

nation and leave the witness still

(a)

Wharton I

But a pardon,

Sec.540.

or the

to incrimi-

liable to disgrace.

20
Text, writers and judges have
is

tinction, but it
is

laid no stress on this dis-

highly probable

that in

a case where

it

proper to grant the privilege of silence because the answer

would disgrace,

the courts will grant it,

even when the wit-

ness is protected by a pardon or the statute of limitations.
In

such cases the reasons

ished force,

for the rule still

and no sufficient

exist in undimin-

considerations

can be found why

the witness should be deprived of its benefits.
nation of the cases

An exami-

cited by text writers as authority far the

general proposition that a witness will be compelled to' answer
when released from liability
itations,

by a pardon or the statute of lin-

will show that they are all

cases

in

wlich the ques-

tion asked was relevant and material to the issue,

and. there-

fore the fact that the answers would disgrace the witness
could form no basis for a claim of privilege.
English cases are of any value in
Trial of Reading,
bury,
321,

6 How. St. Tr.
uphold

(a)

7 How.St.Tr.

this connection,

296; Reg.

1171; and Reg.

(a)

v.

v.

Boyes,

Few of

the

but The

Earl of Shaftes1 B. & S.,

the view here advanced.

Roberts v. Allat, 1 M. & Malk. 192.
Parkhurst v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 400.
Williams v. Farrington, 2 Cox Oh. R.
Davis v. Reid, 2 Sime. 443.
Close v., Aiken, 1 Den. 319.
Bank of Salina v. Henry, 2 Den. 155.
Weldon v. Burch, 12 111. 374.
U. S. v. Smith, 4 Day ( Conn.) 121.

202.

at page
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Numerous statutes have been passed compelling the witness
to testify, but protecting him against incrimination.

In this

connection the question whether the constitutional provis ion
protects witnesses becomes important; for in those states
which hold that the constitutional privilege extends only to
the accused and that the privilege of the witness depends on
statutory or common law, any statute upon this subject will be
valid and no question of its constitutionality can arise.
But where it has been held. that the constitutional provision
is broad enough to protect witnesses, the relation of the
statutes to the constitution enters into the discussion.
Without going into a close analysis of these statutes, we my
two
divide them generally intoAclasses:
those providing that
no prosecution for the crime in question shall ever be brought
against the witness;

and

those providing that the evidence

shall not be used against the witness on any criminal prosection.

Statutes of the first class give complete

and are everywhere regarded as cons titutional.
of the second class, the courts are divicded.

imaunity

As toa those
The Supr'eme

Court of the United States, in the late case of Couns elman v.
HiitchcocIk (142 U. 5. 547), expresses the better opinion in
these words:

"

In view of th e constitutional privilege, a

"statutory enactment to be valid must afford absolute immunity

"against future prosecution for the offense to which the ques"tion relates."

Referring to the provision in question, tine

22
" This,

Court says:

off course,

protected him against the use

"Of his testimony against him or his property in
"tion against him or his property
a court

In
It

of the United States.

could not and would not,

in

"him or his property,
It

convicted,

which shiould

able construction
ness

is

protected

with it,

(a)

same effect,

from being compelled
sources

the

of its

may be obtained,

without using his

against

such court.

Cullen v.

Comm.

State v.

Nowell,

Temple v.

Comm.

is

a reason-

provision that
to disclose the

or" of his

direct evidence

the

or the means
connection

for his conviction

(a)

against him.

314.

892.

Contra.
State v.

Quarl~s,

13 Ark.

307.

Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255.
Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Wilkins

v.

Malone,

14 Ind.

wit-w

circum-

624.

58 N. H.
75 Va.

it

that

or made effectual

24 Gatt.

Emery's case

"

from which,

commission,

answers as

to the tes

he had refu.sed to answer,

and. if

of the constitutional

evidence

evidence

and. on which he mi ht

been convicted.

to the

stances of his offense;
by which,

in

directly

compulsion,

when otherwise,

112) holds

to bfe used

be attributable

"he could not possibly have
(107 Mass.

had. only that effect.

a criminal proceeding in

"timony he might give under
"bie

it

But

the obtaining and the use of witnesses

could. not prevent

"and evidence

any crLi'nal proceeding,

prevent the use of his testimony

"to search out other testimony

'

in

any prosecu-

153.

Peo. v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, approved in
Peo. v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427.
La Fontaine v. So. Underwriters, 83 N. C. 132.

23
In Counselman v. Hitchcock

(supra), Mr. Justice Blatchford

says of these conflicting decisions:

" It is contended on the

"part of the appellee that the reason why the courts in Va.,
"Mass., and. N. H. have lheld that the exonerating statute must
"be so broad as to give thie witness complete amnesty, is that
"the constitutions of these states give to the witness, a broad"er privilege and exemption than is granted by the constitution
"of the United States, in that thgeir language is that the wit"ness shall not be compelled to accuse himself, or furnish evi"dence against himself, or givej evidence against himself; and
"it is contended that the terms of the constitution of the
"United States and of the constitution of Georgia, California
"and New York are more restricted.

But we are of opinion that

"however this difference may have been commented on in same of
"the decisions, there is really in spirit and principle, no
"distinction arising out of such difference in language.

SEC. 12.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE PRIVILEGE IS ALLOWED.

Cases and text writers have involved this point in needless confusion.

The circ- nstances under ',vhich the right is

claimed have of necessity varied widely;
which are taken into account in
are many: nevertheless,
the

the coensiderstions

arriving at any one decision

when a cour't was

called upon to apply

law to one particular set of circumstances,

to settle
Lreat

the
danger.

law of the entire
Of course,

we

subject,

it

proceeded

a labor fraught with

.must expect

to mee-t

difficulty

24
We have to reconcile the right of the people

and conflict.
in

criminal proceedings,

civil proceedings,

and of the contesting parties in

to whatever evidence

the witness can give,

with the personal right of the witness.

We must recognize

that this privilege will be claimed by those honestly entitled
to its
its

protection,

and also by those who are endeavoring under

cover to defeat the purpose of the law.

In spite of

these difficulties, the theory is of vastly greater difficulty
than the practice,
indulged in
ed in

and the majority of those cases which have

deceptive dicta have decided the q-estions

a much more satisfactory manner;

so that it

is

involv-

believed

that definite propositions can be laid down covering this subject,

which can be well supported by reason and authority.
In

the first

meets us in

place,

we must get rid of one error which

every text book and report;

any case-has held,

or that any case can hold,

and not the judge decides

a misuse of terms.

the idea that

that the witness

the question whether or not the pri-

vilege shall be granted.

This is no real error,

The judge always is,

the one who decides what evidence is

to claim his privilege,

but rather

and always must be,

adrissable and what privi-

leges are to be granted to witnesses.
do is

this is,

All the witness can

and state the grounds of the

claim.

No case has ever gone farther than to say that such

evidence,

when given under oath,

tion,

rule has

and even this

statement that

it

is

was conclusive of the ques-

always

been qualified by the

not conclusive when the judge can clearly

25
see contumacy or error on the part of the witness.
is

always the arbiter in

any claim of privilege;

The judge

the discus

sion must be of the anount and kind of evidence which it

-

is

necessary to bring before hil.
One other point of more vital importance must be settled
at the beginning of this discussion.
nal Evidence,

at page 140,

says:

Roscoe in his Crimi"

Of course,

the witness

"must always pledge his oath that he will incur risk;" and

this has been called thi

rule in a niunbcr of decisions.

Obviously, such a rule renders the privilege wortlless.

It

compes a man upon his oath to accuse himself, in order tie
gain the then worthless privilege of silence.

In

the answer to which might directly criminate,,the

unconstitu -

tionality of such a method is

clearly seen.

a question

The witness must

swear that the truthful answer would incriminate hin, testify
to his own guilt,

and thereupon

permit him to be silent.
tution,

the judge will most graciously

To give any effect to the consti-

the rule must be thmt the

witness may clanim his

privi-

lege., on the ground that one of th~e possible answers would in-.
criminate,
so.

Where the answer might disclose a fact tending to in-

criminate,
the

without swearing that the truthful answer would do

the oath of the witness may be usefu l in

convincing

judge that the tr'utliful answer w:ould form a link in

chain of evidence,

the

but such an oath cannot be reTarded as a

prerequisite to the granting of thie pr'ivilege.

26
The witness may claim his privilege on any one of three

grounds:
(1) That one of the possible answers would disgrace him.
(2) That one of the possible answers would directly incriminate him.
(3) That one of the possible answers would tend to in criminate him.
of these

the first

In

cases

court will not grant the claim,

there

is

no difficulty.

unless

it

can see

disgrace the

the probable answers would directly
As Judge Marshall
"witness
"cause

in

Burr's Trial,

the answer may disgrace him,

"t ion of other facts,
No serious
may be laid

witness.
a

"'Where

the

the evidence,

answer may,

without the interven-

(a)
fix on him moral turpitude.
meets us

difficulty

in

"

the second class,

and

down as the correct rule that when the court
case and the nature of

that any answer to the q aestion in

ble course of events would lead directly
cut ion against

be-

or render him infamous,

can see from the circumstances of the

(a)

that one of

claims to be excused from answering a question,

"the court must see that

it

it,

expresses

The

the witness,

Phillipps II,

tZhe

court

Star Page 941,

the reasona-

to a crtrninal
should grant

C. II.

Greenleaf, Sec. 454.
1462.
Taylor's Ev. II,
Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wend. 250.
Mac Bride V. Mac Bride, 4 Esp. Rep.
Parkhurst v. Lowton, 1 Mer. 400.

prose-

the

& E's Note.

242.
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(al
priv ile)ge.
In

case three,

circumstances
whether

there

fendant

is

is

from the

determnine

and the nature

of the cese

of thie

evidence,

reasonable ground to apprehend that

liable

suggested by the

is

the court must first

to a criminal
ouestion.

prosecut ion upon

If

the

court

no reasonable ground to apprehend that

the

decides

the

the dernound

that

defendant

there

is

so

(b)
liable,
But

the witness
if

the

will be compelled to answer the

judge decides

such apprehension,

reasonable ground for

that there is

then the prisoner

judge should permit him t o refuse

is

in

cannot see how the

danger,

and the

to answer a question,

answer to whikch would tend to incriminate
judge

question.

him,

even though the

answer would form a link in
(c)

a chain

of criminating evidence.
(a)

Regina v. Boyes, 9 W. R. 690.
Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 762.
Stevens v. St'ate, 50 Kas. 712.
98.
Ward v. State, 2 Mto.
Fellows v. Wilson, 31 Barb, l3'2.

(b)I Burr's Trial, 245.
St. v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.
Youngs v. Youngs, 5 Redf. 505.
In Re As ton, 27 Beav. 474.
(c)

Chase's Note to Stephen's Dig. of Ev. 209.
Taylor on Ev. II, Sec. 1457.
Wharton's Law of Ev. I,
Sec. 53 3.
4 Wen. 235.
Peo. v. Mather,
Temple v. Comm. 75 Va. 892.
Janvrin v. Scam mon, 10 Foster ( N. H.) 280.
State v. Edwards, II Not t & MA. C. 13 ( S. S.)

Short v. Mercier, 15 Jur. 93.
Lamb v. Munster, L. R. 10 Q. 3.

any

D. 110.
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The

Let us analyze this proposition more closely.
possible, circumstances

The Court sees that the witness is

(a)

question- is

asked,

classes.

may be divided into three
in

danger;

a

the answer to which the judge can see would

tend to incriminate

Of course,

the witness.

the privilege is

allowed.
The prisoner is

(b)

in

danger,

is

the privilege

claimed;

but the judge can see either contumacy or the impossibility of
any answer incriminating,
of course,
(c)
judge is
nate:

Here,

or tending to incriminate.

the privilege will be denied.
in

The witness

a question asked;

danger,

but thie

unable to see how any answer would tend tio incrimi-

that is,

form a link in

he is

unable tfo see just how any answer would
Neverthe-

a chain of incriminating evidence.

less, he should give the prisoner
In

grant the privilege.

the benefit of the doubt and

such a case,

"reasonable grounds

"exist for apprehending danger to the witness from his being
"compelled to answer."
Those cases wlhich are commnly cited as holding ,that the

decision rests with the witness,

hold no more than this.

An examination of them will uiorzn-l

show that the witness

was already in danger of a criminal prosecution in regard to
the matter under consideration,

and th]at therefore

accepted his oath as

evidence

sufficient

the answer with the subject matter.
Perritt

( I Speers

S

,

121 ),

of the

the court

connection

For example,

here the reporter

of

Poole v.
says:

29

" The presiding judge was of opinion, that he was not

bound

" to answer the question, as it might, by being followed up
"

by other questions, fix upon him the charge of gaming. "

Also, Printz v. Cheeney (11 Iowa, 469),

" The question asked

"

tended to obtain from the witness certain facts which would

"

prove that he was present and. aided in the commission of the
offense.

"

Warner v. Lucas

(10 Ohio,

337), c.ontains a dictum which

goes farther than this in favor of the witness, but this can
be supported by neither reason nor authority.
But all these propositions must be qualified by the rule
expressed in Taylor v. Forbes

(143 N. Y. 231):

"

The weight

"of authority seems to be in favor of the rule that the wit"ness may be compelled to answer when he contumaciously refus"es, or when it is perfectly clear and. plain that he is mis"taken, and that the answer cannot possibly injure him, or
"tend in
"

any degree to subject him to the peril of prcsecution.

But the courts have recognized the impossibility in most

"cases of anticipating the effect of the answer, where it

is

"not so perfectly evident and manifest that the answer' called
"for cannot incriminate,

as to preclude all reasonable doubt

"or fair argument, the privilege must be recognized
"tected.

"

See also Janvriin v. Scammon

(29 N. H. 230).

anid pro-

"0

SEC.

13.

SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.

Evidence which the witness is compelled to give cannot

(a)
be used against him in any subsequent proceedings;

nor

the fact that le took advant-age of his privilege and refused
(b)
to answer.
(a) State v. Bailey, 54 Iowa,
Gr. Ev. Sec. 451.
Reg.

v.

Garbett,

2 C.& K.

414.
474.

Conn. Rev. Stat. 1849, Title 6, See.
Virg. Code 1849, C. 199, Sec. 22.
Roscoe Crim. Ev. p. 148.
Starkin on EV. Star Page 206.
Horstman v. Kau4 fman, 97 Pa. St. 147.
Hendrickson v. Peo. 10 N. Ye, 9, 27,
(b)

Wharton Ev. I, Sec. 53g.
State v. Bailey, 54 Iowa, 414.
Rapalje on Witnesses, Sec. 267.
Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234.

161.

31.
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CONCLUSION.

While many of the leading principles
of evidence
period,

it

is
is

founded were known and adrnitted at an early
nevertheless

dence has a history
years.

It

beyond doubt

of not more

that

the law of evi-

than two hundred. and fifty

has been frequently said that no law of evidence

existed prior to 1688.
been rapid,

Since that time the developement has

and great reforms have been introduced in

phase of the subject.
modern legislation,
feet;

upon which the law

But

with all

the system is

the improvements

necessarily

Able. men have made vigorous

of

far fr.om per-

the time has been too short for approximate

to perfection.

every

attainment

attacks upon the

privilege of the witness, which has been the subject of this
thesis,
ly,

and it

is

entirely

worth our while to look,

at the grounds upon which this

probability of. change.

This

privilege

and the

conclusion will make no attempt

to smrnarize even th~e many arguments
tem,

rests

very brief-

against

the present

but will be confined to a glance at the relative

sys-

value

and permanence of the reasons upon which the privilege must
rest.

It

must be understood,

however,

off the witness and of the accused,

that the privilege

stand or fall

To retain the privilege of the accused

tog ether.

and. do away with that

of the

witness,

would only result

accusing the wrong man,
examine all

suspects.

in

is

question

in

in

the prosecuting

officer's

order that he mighit thus freely
The reeasons upon which the

sustained are six in

(1)

The prevention of perjury.

(2)

Prevention of deception

principle

number.

of judges and jurymen,

(3) Encourrge.rnt of witnesses.
(4)

Difficulties

in

the practice of the

inquisitorial

system.

torial

(5)

Danger

(3)

The natural protest of free men against an inquisi-

system,

of abuse of the

inquisitorial

which would extract

incriminating

either by the bodily tQrture of the rack,
ture of a merciless
The first

tendance

in

or the mental tor-

two of these reasons are no

which the reforms

evidence

cross-examination.

They were the reasons

come by the

system.

assigned for those exclusionary

have set aside.

effectiveness

of witnesses.

longer valuable.
rules

The third reason is over

of our system for

the enforced at-

would undoubtedly

Difficulties

the enforcement of a provision compelling answers,

arise

obsti-

nate witnesses would be met with; but these same difficulties
have been met and surmounted in
degrees.

Obstinate witnesses have been successfully

with where the motives
fear of self

the enforcement of equity

of refusal

incrimination.

were

fully as strong

The tendency

dealt
as the

to non-disclosur'e

33
where the answer would lead to civil loss,
C...reat as where incrimination
has ben .made a(ainst the

is

would result,

often just as

but no complaint

operation of the rule compilling

disclosure.
The

last two ar;ytments

They broi.,{ht about
academic

are of much ; reater importance.

the adoption of the rule;

the others are

considerations added by the judges and text writers

to bolster up weak points. The inquisitorial system has been
abuscd whenever and wherever

tried.

buse was carried in England

.o what extent t'lis a-

ori,be seen in

the repotts

Stte trials and the Star Chamber Proceedings.

of the

In France,

at th- ,resent time, the judge browbeats the prisoner, intimidates him, seeks to entrap him, :ttcmpts in every ;l.anner to
corkscrew out of him some incriminatingS evidence.
land,

up to the Revolution

time,

had never really used any otherplan.

courts,

of 1688,

with the history o, 'th.

But Eng-

a-ed prance to the present

mast as

In American

a j-:uide,

different re-

sults mijht at least be expected.
The
It

is

!Thst reason is

certizuLy

met by th:e sti:tement

entitled~ to consideration.

that 'men object to'

testimo-

Jiviu;-

ry self incriminatin[;,simply and only on accounrt of th.e pu.nishment which it

cey'tainl-T

be

involvtstL .t t'w<vY

coinsidered

hic natural objection to
sfficient

o ecuse

no -,rd.er

t

-ivir-

self

is

tura

fth
the
rn
incri

etmn

punis.ment;
iuatiw

objectio

,

a

that

if

evidencc

is

to purishrmet

should -lso excuse him from that.
I think this is

sufficient to show that thie privilege of

the witness and of the accused does not rest upon unassailable
grounds.

That these Lrounds will be vigorously attacked is

beyond doubt.
will

It

is

probably safe to say that some state

experiment with a return to the inquisitorial system.

Such an experiment would be watched with the greatest interest,
and of course,

upon it5 success or failure would depend to a

large degree the future of the principle outlined in the preceding pages.

